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1Crowd-averse cyber-physical systems: the paradigm of
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Dario Bauso and Hamidou Tembine
Abstract—For a networked controlled system we illustrate the
paradigm of robust mean-field games. This is a modeling frame-
work at the interface of differential game theory, mathematical
physics, and H∞-optimal control that tries to capture the
mutual influence between a crowd and its individuals. First, we
establish a mean-field system for such games including the effects
of adversarial disturbances. Second, we identify the optimal
response of the individuals for a given population behavior.
Third, we provide an analysis of equilibria and their stability.
I. INTRODUCTION
Cyber-physical systems (CPSs) involve computation and
physical processes with, possibly, humans in the loop. CPSs
are required to maintain a “good” performance even in
the presence of adversarial disturbances or cyber-attacks.
A second issue is concurrency as physical processes are
compositions of many parallel dynamics, in contrast to
software processes, which are rooted in sequential steps.
Thus the need to bridge an inherently sequential semantics
with an intrinsically concurrent physical world [8]. In hybrid
systems, a similar aspect yields to minimum attention control
[9].
Robust mean-field games intersect CPSs in at least the
following aspects: i) the game describes a large-scale dis-
tributed system where the players may represent the system
components, ii) worst-case adversarial disturbances represent
cyber-attacks on each single system component, iii) the
mean-field term in the cost accounts for the congestion in
the communication network. In addition, heuristics rather
than cumbersome strategies on the part of the players are
due to the limited computational capabilities of the humans
in the loop. For the above reasons, we have identified in the
“mean-field game theory” a suitable paradigmatic modeling
framework.
Highlights of contributions. Each player evolves according
to a linear stochastic differential equation (SDE) and mini-
mizes a cost functional which includes a cross-coupling term.
Such a term penalizes the use of the shared communication
network when congested and therefore constitutes the cou-
pling term between individuals and population. An adver-
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sarial disturbance with limited energy resources attacks each
individual player in order to maximize the cost functional
[18].
The contribution of this paper is three-fold: First, we
establish a mean-field system for such a game including the
effects of adversarial disturbances, which we call “robust”
mean-field game. Second, we identify the optimal response of
the individuals for a given population behavior. The latter is
captured by the mean-field term. Third, we provide a detailed
analysis of equilibria.
Related literature on mean-field games. Mean field games
were formulated by Huang et al. in [11] and independently
by Lasry and Lions in [14] and arise in several application
domains (see [1, 6, 10, 11, 13, 16, 20]). The approach leads
to a system of two partial differential equations (PDEs).
The first PDE is the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation.
The second PDE is the Fokker-Planck-Kolmogorov (FPK)
equation which describes the density of the players [14, 19].
Explicit solutions exist for the linear-quadratic structure, see
[2], while in general a variety of numerical solution schemes
are available in the literature [1]. More recently, robustness
and risk-sensitivity have been brought into the picture of
mean-field games [4, 5, 19]. The first PDE is then the
Hamilton-Jacobi-Isaacs (HJI) equation.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we
formulate the problem. In Section III, we illustrate the mean-
field game. In Section IV, we study equilibria and stability. In
Section V, we provide numerical studies. Finally, in Section
VI, we provide conclusions.
Notation We denote by (Ω,F ,P) a complete probability
space. We let B be a finite-dimensional standard Brownian
motion defined on this probability space. We define F =
(Ft)t≥0, its natural filtration augmented by all the P−null
sets (sets of measure-zero with the respect P). We write
∂x and ∂2xx to stand respectively for the first and second
derivatives with respect to x. We denote by R+ the set of
nonnegative reals. For any real ξ ∈ R, [ξ]+ denotes the
positive part.
II. CROWD-AVERSION PROBLEM SET-UP
Consider a set of players N = {1, . . . , n} and let xj,0 ∈
R+ be the initial state of generic player j ∈ N , which is
realized according to the probability distribution m0. The
state of player j at time t, denoted by xj,t ∈ R+ evolves
over a finite horizon T > 0 as:
dxj,t = [αxj,t + βuj,t]dt+ σ [xj,tdBj,t + ζtdt] , (1)
where uj,t ∈ R+ is the control input, Bj,t is a standard
Brownian motion, which is independent of the initial state
2xj,0, independent across players and time, α, σ ∈ R and
β < 0 are parameters, ζt is an adversarial disturbance.
Let us denote the empirical measures of the states and
of the controls at time t by mt = 1n
∑n
j=1 δxj,t and zt =
1
n
∑n
j=1 δuj,t , respectively, where δ is the Dirac measure. In
addition, let z¯t and m¯t be the mean of the process zt and mt,
respectively. Let us introduce the following cost functional
with penalty on final state g(·), stage cost function c(·), and
quadratic penalty on the unknown disturbance
J(xj,0, uj , z¯, ζ) = E
(
g(xj,T )
+
∫ T
0
c(xj,t, uj,t, z¯t)dt − γ2
∫ T
0
|ζt|2dt
)
.
Players wish to stabilize their states to zero, and therefore
we can take for the stage cost
c(xj,t, uj,t, z¯t, ζt) = h(z¯t)uj,t +
[
a
2
(xj,t)
2 +
b
2
(uj,t)
2
]
,
where h(z¯t) is a measure of the “crowd”, and thus h(z¯t)uj,t
is a penalty on the control of the single player which is
proportional to the crowd in the control loop for the whole
system; a
2
(xj,t)
2 where a > 0 is the cost of a nonnull state,
and b
2
(uj,t)
2 where b > 0 accounts for the control energy.
The penalty on final state g(xj,T ) = φ(xj,T )2, for a given
scalar φ > 0, namely it is quadratic with minimum in zero
thus penalizing non null states at the end of the horizon. We
assume that the crowd is proportional to the magnitude of
the average control, namely
h(z¯t) = k|z¯t| = k
∣∣∣ 1n∑nj=1 uj,t∣∣∣ , k ∈ R+.
= k
∣∣∣ 1β ddtm¯t − αβ m¯t − σβ ζt∣∣∣ . (2)
The last equality is obtained by introducing expectations in
(1), by considering deterministic disturbance ζt, and by using
indistinguishability, from which we can write:
[Euj,t] = 1β
(
d
dt
[Exj,t]
)− α
β
([Exj,t])− σβ ζt
= 1
β
(
d
dt
∫
xmt(dx)
)− α
β
(∫
xmt(dx)
)− σ
β
ζt.
When n −→ +∞, we have the following robust mean-
field game problem [4, 5].
Problem 1. (Robust mean-field response problem) Let B
be a one-dimensional Brownian Motion defined on (Ω,F ,P),
where F is the natural filtration generated by B. Let x0
be independent of B and with density m0(x). Consider the
problem in R and (0, T ]{
inf
{ut}t
sup
{ζt}t
J(x, u, z¯, ζ)
dxt = [αxt + βut + σζt] dt + σxtdBt.
Model (1) may represent a multi-tank system [12], where
the state is the tank level, the control stabilizes the level to
zero, while an adversary provides obstacles to this. Model (1)
fits also to the case of a power grid, where the state is the
rotor angle of each generator, the control operates in order
to guarantee transient stability despite the volatility of wind
or solar power sources [17]. A third example is given by
cyber-physical economic systems; here (1) shares similarity
with the Black and Scholes model [7] derived in the context
of portfolio selection.
III. THE RESULTING MEAN-FIELD GAME
Let us denote by vt(x) the (upper) value of the robust
optimization problem under worst-case disturbance starting
from time t at state x. Let the Hamiltonian be given by
H(x, p, z¯) = inf
u
{c(x, u, z¯) + p(αx+ βu)} ,
where p is the co-state. The next result introduces the mean-
field system for the case of crowd-averse CPSs and closed-
loop control and disturbance.
Theorem 1. The closed-loop robust mean-field game for the
crowd-averse CPSs takes on the form:
∂tvt +
[
− 1
2b
β2 +
(
σ
2γ
)2]
|∂xvt|2
+
[− 1
2b
(2h(z¯t)β) + αxt
]
∂xvt (HJI)
− 1
2b
h(z¯t)
2 + a
2
(xt)
2 + 1
2
σ2x2∂2xxvt = 0,
in R+ × [0, T ), vT = φ|x|2, in R+
∂tmt + ∂x
[
mt
(
αxt + β
−h(z¯t)−∂xvtβ
b
+ σ
2
2γ2
∂xvt
)]
+ σ
2
2γ2
∂x(mt∂xvt) (FPK)
− 1
2
σ2∂2xx
[
x2mt
]
= 0, in R+ × [0, T ),
m0(x) given in R+,
˙¯mt = αm¯t + βz¯
∗
t + σζ¯
∗
t , m¯0 given,
(3)
where z¯∗t :=
∫
R+ u
∗
t (x)mt(x)dx, ζ¯
∗
t :=
∫
R+ ζ
∗
t (x)mt(x)dx
and the optimal closed-loop control and disturbance are{
u∗t (x) =
−h(z¯t)−∂xvtβ
b
,
ζ∗t (x) =
σ
2γ2
∂xvt(x).
(4)
Proof: Given in the appendix.
The significance of the above result is that to find the
optimal control input we need to solve the two coupled PDEs
in (3) in v and m with given boundary conditions (second
and fourth conditions). Any solution of the above system
of equations is referred to as worst-disturbance feedback
mean-field equilibrium. The difference with a mean-field
equilibrium is that the first PDE is now a Hamilton-Jacobi-
Isaacs (HJI) equation involving a minimax optimization and
not a Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation. Analogously to the
mean-field equilibrium case, such a fixed point can be cal-
culated iteratively solving the HJI equation for fixed mt and
by entering the optimal u∗t and the worst-case disturbance
ζ∗t in the Fokker-Planck-Kolmogorov equation in (3), until a
fixed point in vt and mt is reached.
Remark 1. Let m0 be absolutely continuous with a contin-
uous density function with finite second moment. Since the
running cost is convex in u, and concave in the disturbance
ζ, one gets a convex-concave stage cost function that satisfies
c−γ2‖ζ‖2
‖u‖ −→ +∞ and c−γ
2‖ζ‖2
‖ζ‖ −→ −∞, as ‖u‖, ‖ζ‖
goes to infinity. The drift is linear and hence Lipschitz
continuous because α, β, σ are bounded. We assume that
the Fenchel transform of c is Lipschitz in (x, z). Finally,
we assume that the function p 7−→ σ2
4γ2
‖p‖2 + H is
strictly convex, differentiable and σ
2
4γ2
‖p‖2 +H is Lipschitz
continuous. Under the above main assumptions, the existence
of solution is established in Theorem 2.6 in [14].
3IV. A HEURISTIC APPROACH
In this section, we present a heuristic approach to approx-
imate the mean-field equilibrium and provide performance
bounds. The method was first developed in [3] and it is
here adapted to the problem at hand. The heuristic approach
reframes the problem in an extended state space involving
both the state of the player and the average state distribution.
A. Extended state space
In the next assumption, we consider a lower bound on the
rate of change of the mean m¯t. At the end of this section,
we establish a specific value for such a lower bound.
Assumption 1. Suppose there exists a θ > 0 and a
corresponding m˜t such that{
d
dt
m¯t ≥ ddtm˜t = −θm˜t, for all t ∈ [0, T ],
m¯0 = m˜0.
(5)
In addition to this, let us also assume that ζ¯t = δm˜t.
From (2) and substituting m¯t by the approximate dynamics
d
dt
m˜t = −θm˜t, m¯0 = m˜0, we can rewrite
h(z¯t) = k
∣∣∣−θ − α− σδ
β
m˜t
∣∣∣ := 2sm˜t. (6)
We can then approximate the problem at hand as follows:
inf
{ut}t
sup
{ζt}t
∫ T
0
[
2sm˜tut +
q
2
m˜2t
+
(
a
2
x2t +
b
2
u2t − γ2ζ2t
)]
dt+ g(xT )
s.t.
[
dxt
dm˜t
]
=
([ α 0
0 −θ
] [
xt
m˜t
]
+
[
β
0
]
ut
+
[
σ
0
]
ζt
)
dt+
[
σxtdBt
0
]
,
where the term q
2
m˜2t is here introduced to guarantee convex-
ity of the cost as formalized later in Assumption 2.
Reformulating the problem in terms of the expanded state
and a new control expressed as:
Xt =
[
xt
m˜t
]
, u˜t = ut +
2
b
sm˜, (7)
and by completing the square in the objective function we
obtain the following linear quadratic problem: inf{u˜t}t sup{ζt}t
∫ T
0
[
1
2
(XTt Q˜Xt +Ru˜
2
t − Γζ2t )
]
dt+ g(xT )
dXt = (A˜Xt +Bu˜t + Cζt)dt+ CxtdBt,
where
Q˜ =
[
a 0
0 q − 4
b
s2
]
, R = b, Γ = 2γ2,
A˜ =
[
α −β 2
b
s
0 −θ
]
, B =
[
β
0
]
, C =
[
σ
0
]
.
Now the idea is to consider a new value function Vt(x, m˜)
(in compact form Vt(X)) in the expanded state space, which
satisfies
∂tVt(X) +H(X, ∂XVt(X))
+
(
σ
2γ
)2
|∂xVt(X)|2 + 12σ2x2∂2xxVt(X) = 0,
VT (X) = g(x).
(8)
Let us take for it the following quadratic expression:
V(x, m¯, t) = [xt m˜t]
[
P11,t P12,t
P21,t P22,t
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Pt
[
xt
m˜t
]
,
where the matrix Pt, must be solution of the differential
Riccati equation
P˙t + PtA˜+ A˜
TPt − 2Pt(BR−1BT
−CΓ−1CT )Pt + Q˜2 +W = 0,
(9)
and where
BR−1BT − CΓ−1CT =
[ 1
b
β2 + 1
2γ2
σ2 0
0 0
]
,
W =
[
σ2P11 0
0 0
]
.
(10)
Assumption 2. Parameters q and s are such that
Q˜ =
[
a 0
0 q − 4
b
s2
]
≥ 0. (11)
Let P be solution of the above differential Riccati equa-
tion, then we know that the optimal value for control u˜ is of
the form
u˜∗t (Xt) = −2R−1BTPXt
= − 2
b
[β 0]
[
P11,t P12,t
P21,t P22,t
] [
xt
m˜t
]
= − 2β
b
(P11,txt + P12,tm˜t).
(12)
From the above expression and from (7) it is immediate to
derive the current optimal control
u∗t (Xt) = − 2b [βP11,txt + (βP12,t + s)m˜t], (13)
and the worst disturbance is
ζ˜∗t (Xt) = 2Γ
−1CTPXt
= 1
γ2
[σ 0]
[
P11,t P12,t
P21,t P22,t
] [
xt
m˜t
]
= 1
γ2
σ(P11,txt + P12,tm˜t).
(14)
Note that if we take the average in (14) then the condition
ζ¯t = δm˜t in Assumption 1 is satisfied.
In addition, a possible value for θ can be obtained by
taking m˜t = 0 for all t in (13) and (14). By averaging
we obtain z¯∗t and ζ¯∗t , which we can substitute in ˙¯mt =
αm¯t + βz¯
∗
t + σζ¯
∗
t to obtain the following expression
θ =
[
α+ (−2β
2
b
+
σ2
γ2
)P11,t
]
.
Bounds for the proposed heuristics when σ = 0 can be
obtained as follows. For the lower bound we take m˜t = 0 for
all t and solve the resulting linear quadratic problem. This
yields the Riccati equation
p˙i0 + 2pi0α− 2
b
pi20β
2 +
1
2
a = 0. (15)
For the upper bound, let us take m˜t = m¯0 for all t, and
consider the Taylor expansion pi = pi0 + m¯0pi1. The Riccati
equation takes the form
p˙i + 2pi
(
α+ (− 2
b
βs)m¯0
)
− 2
b
pi2β2 + 1
2
(
a+ (q − 2
b
s2)m¯0
)
= d
dt
(pi0 + m¯0pi1) + 2(pi0 + m¯0pi1)
(
α+ (− 2
b
βs)m¯0
)
− 2
b
(pi0 + m¯0pi1)
2β2 + 1
2
(
a+ (q − 2
b
s2)m¯0
)
= 0.
4Neglecting higher order infinitesimals, from (15) and collect-
ing all terms in pi1 we have
p˙i1 + pi1(2α− 4bpi0β2) + 2pi0(−β 2b s) + 12 (q − 2b s2) = 0.
Observing that for a sufficiently small m¯0, then (q −
2
b
s2)m¯0 ≥ (q − 2b s2)m¯20, we can conclude
pi0x
2 ≤ vt(x),Vt(X) ≤ pix2.
Remark 2. Let P1 be the set of Borel probability measures
m on R with finite first order moment and let m¯ be its
mean. Also, let c˜(x, m¯) := 2sm¯u + q
2
m¯2 + a
2
x2. It holds
∀(x1,m1), (x2,m2) ∈ R× P1
|c˜(x1, m¯1)− c˜(x2, m¯2)| ≤ C0[|x1 − x2|+ d1(m1,m2)],
where d1 is the Kantorovitch- Rubinstein distance. Then the
solution to the game with infinite number of players, namely
when n −→ +∞, approximates the game with a finite
number of players following the same approximation bounds
established in [11, 14].
B. Asymptotic stability and mean-field equilibrium
Using the optimal control and worst-case disturbance (13)-
(14) in the SDE (1) we obtain
dxt = αxt + (− 2β2b + σ
2
γ2
)P11,txt + [(− 2β2b + σ
2
γ2
)P12,t
−β 2
b
s]m˜t + σxtdBt, t ∈ (0, T ], x0 ∈ R.
The above SDE is linear and time-varying. The correspond-
ing stochastic process can be studied in the framework of
stochastic stability theory [15].
To do this, let us take as Lyapunov function the quadratic
function V (x) = Φx2, then the stochastic derivative of V (x)
is obtained by applying the infinitesimal generator to V (x)
which yields LV (x) = [σ2 + 2(α− 2β2
b
+ σ
2
γ2
)]Φx2.
Theorem 2 ([15]). If V (x) ≥ 0, V (0) = 0 and LV (x) ≤
−ηV (x) on Q := {x : V (x) ≤ } for some η > 0 and for
arbitrarily large , then the origin is asymptotically stable
“with probability one”, and
Px0{ sup
T≤t<+∞
x2t ≥ λ} ≤ V (x0)e
−ψT
λ
for some ψ > 0.
From the above theorem, we have the following result,
which establishes exponential stochastic stability of the
mean-field equilibrium provided above.
Corollary IV.1. If [σ2 + 2(α − 2β2
b
+ σ
2
γ2
)]Φ < 0 then
limt→∞xt = 0 almost surely and
Px0{ sup
T≤t<+∞
x2t ≥ λ} ≤ V (x0)e
−ψT
λ
for some ψ > 0.
The interpretation of the above result is that the players
stabilize their states to zero asymptotically, while predicting
the evolution of congestion as formulated in Problem 1.
We can approximate the mean-field equilibrium, which is
captured by the evolution of m¯t over the horizon (0, T ], as
d
dt
m¯t =
[
α+ (− 2β2
b
+ σ
2
γ2
)(P11,t + P12,t)− β 2b s
]
m¯t
t ∈ (0, T ], x0 ∈ R.
σ [10−2] std(m0) b Q
I 10−2 {2, 5, 10} 25 5
II {2, 4, 10} 1 25 5
III 1 5 {20, 25, 100} {4, 5, 20}
TABLE I
VARYING SIMULATION PARAMETERS WITH DIFFERENT REGIMES.
Actually, we can derive a differential equation which
represents a bound for the mean distribution:{
m¯t = m¯0e
ρt
ρ = α+ (− 2β2
b
+ σ
2
γ2
)(P11,t + P12,t)− β 2b s.
The equation above corresponds to saying that the mean
distribution converges exponentially to zero in absence of
the stochastic disturbances (the Brownian motion), under the
assumption that ρ is strictly negative.
V. NUMERICAL STUDIES
Consider a number of players n = 103 and a discretized
set of states X = {xmin, xmin + 1, . . . , xmax} where
xmin = 0 and xmax = 100 (see parameters in in Table
I). We set α = 0 and β = −1 and consider the influence
of ζt implicitly by increasing the coefficient Q used in the
quadratic approximation of the value function vt = Qx2. The
horizon length is T = 40. We assume m0 to be Gaussian
with mean m¯0 between 20 and 70 and standard deviation
std(m0) between 1 and 10. We adopt the linear function
hˆ(m¯) =
(
102 − m¯
102
)
hmin +
(
1− 10
2 − m¯
102
)
hmax.
(16)
The above function represents a linear approximation of
h(m¯, .) with minimal value hmin = 0 when the mean
distribution is minimal, m¯ = xmin, and maximal value
hmax = 10
2 when the mean distribution is maximal,
m¯ = xmax. Note that the heuristic method provides linear
state feedback control and worst-case disturbance policies.
Then the right-hand-side of (2) is linear in m¯. Furthermore,
we approximate ∂xvt = Qx and thus we replace the optimal
production in (4) by
u∗t =
−hˆ(m¯t) + 2Qx
b
. (17)
According to a first pattern, we have a constant decrease
of m¯t with time t, as well as of the standard deviation
std(m¯t). Figure 1, left, from top to bottom, shows mt
vs. xt at different times. The initial distribution m0 has
mean m¯0 = 70 and standard deviation std(m0) = 1
(top), std(m0) = 5 (middle), std(m0) = 10 (bottom).
The graphics on the right column display the time plot m¯t
(solid line and y-axis labeling on the left) and the evolution
of std(mt) (dashed line and y-axis labeling on the right).
Note that, at approximately t = 30, m¯t reaches zero while
std(mt) drastically decreases to zero in less than 20 seconds,
which means that all the players first reach consensus on their
states and then drive their states to zero.
The second pattern shows the effects of the Brownian
motion. Indeed, the standard deviation std(mt) as well as
5Algorithm
Input: Set of parameters as in Table I.
Output: Distribution function mt, mean m¯t
and standard deviation std(mt).
1 : Initialize. Generate x0 given m¯0 and std(m0)
2 : for time t = 0, 1, . . . , T − 1 do
3 : if t > 0, then compute mt, m¯t, and std(mt)
4 : end if
5 : compute congestion term hˆ(m¯t),
6 : for player i = 1, 2, . . . , n do
7 : compute new state xt+1 by executing (1)
8 : end for
9 : end for
12 : STOP
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Fig. 1. First pattern: mean distribution m¯t decreases and as well
as standard deviation std(mt).
sparsity increase with time though the mean distribution
m¯t decreases to zero. Before m¯t reaches zero the standard
deviation std(mt) inverts the slope and drastically decays
to zero. This is summarized in Figure 2, left. From top
to bottom, the figure shows the distribution evolution mt
vs. the state xt at different times. The coefficient weighing
the Brownian motion increases from top to bottom, and in
particular is σ = 0.02 (top), σ = 0.04 (middle), σ = 0.1
(bottom). The graphics on the right column display the time
plot m¯t (solid line and y-axis labeling on the left) and the
evolution of the standard deviation std(mt) (dashed line and
y-axis labeling on the right). Note that the standard deviation
std(mt) first increases for t ≤ 8 and then drastically
decreases to zero.
The third pattern highlights the effects of a higher linear
term Qx
b
in comparison with the constant term hˆ(m¯t)
b
in
the control input expression (17). A higher value for Q can
be linked back to the effects of the disturbance ζt. This
is shown in Figure 3, left. From top to bottom, the figure
displays the distribution evolution mt vs. the state xt at
different times. The linear term Qx
b
dominates more and
more in comparison with the constant term hˆ(m¯t)
b
from top
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Fig. 2. Second pattern showing the effects of the Brownian motion:
mean distribution m¯t decreases and standard deviation std(mt) first
increases and then decays drastically to zero.
to bottom. Actually Q = 4, b = 20 (top), Q = 5, b = 25
(middle), and Q = 20, b = 100 (bottom). Note that the
ratio Q
b
is kept constant whereas hˆ(.)
b
is strongly decreasing
from top to bottom. Apparently, the speed of convergence
increases. This is clear from observing the graphics on the
right column which display the time plot m¯t (solid line
and y-axis labeling on the left) and the evolution of the
standard deviation std(mt) (dashed line and y-axis labeling
on the right). Note that both the mean distribution m¯t and the
standard deviation std(mt) decrease monotonically to zero.
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Fig. 3. Third pattern showing the effects of a higher control
coefficient Q (associated with a stronger disturbance ζt): both the
mean distribution m¯t and the standard deviation std(mt) decrease
monotonically.
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS
We have illustrated robust mean-field games as a paradigm
for CPSs. Future directions include the study of i) the con-
nection with risk-sensitive optimal control problems; ii) the
vector state case and infinite horizon (with discounted payoff
and time-average payoff), iii) a cyber-physical economic
market with some big players and many other small players.
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APPENDIX
Proof of Theorem 1. To obtain (4) let the Hamiltonian be:
H(xt, ∂xvt, z¯t) = inf
u
{
h(z¯t)ut +
[
a
2
x2 +
b
2
u2t
]
+∂xvt(αxt + βut)
}
= 0. (18)
After differentiation we obtain but+h(z¯t)+∂xvtβ = 0 from
which we have the expression of u∗t (x) in (4). To derive the
expression of ζ∗t (x), we need to solve supζt
{
− γ2ζ2t +
∂xvtσζt
}
, from which, after differentiation and assuming
concavity on ζt (see Remark 1), we have −2γ2ζ∗t +∂xvtσ =
0 and therefore ζ∗t (x) = σ2γ2 ∂xvt.
We now prove (3). From [4] the robust mean-field game
for Problem 1 is given by
∂tvt(x) +H(x, ∂xvt, z¯t)
+
(
σ
2γ
)2
|∂xvt(x)|2 + 12σ2x2∂2xxvt(x) = 0,
in R+ × [0, T ), vT (x) = φx2, in R+,
∂tmt(x) + ∂x (mt(x)∂pH(x, ∂xvt, z¯t))
+ σ
2
2γ2
∂x(mt(x)∂xvt(x))
− 1
2
σ2∂2xx
[
x2mt(x)
]
= 0,
in R+ × [0, T ), m0(x) given in R+.
(19)
First notice that the second and fourth equations are
the boundary conditions and derive straightforwardly from
Bellman equations and the evolution of the law of states.
To obtain the HJI, let us replace u appearing in the
Hamiltonian (18) by its expression (4):
H(xt, ∂xvt, z¯t) = u
∗
t [h(z¯t) + ∂xvtβ]
+
a
2
(xt)
2 +
b
2
(u∗t )
2 + ∂xvtαxt
= − 1
2b
β2|∂xvt|2 +
[
− 1
2b
(2h(z¯t)β)
+αxt
]
∂xvt − 1
2b
h(z¯t)
2 +
a
2
(xt)
2.
Using the above expression of the Hamiltonian in the HJI
equation in (19), we obtain the HJI in (3).
To prove the third equation, which is a PDE representing
the FPK equation we simply substitute (4) into the FPK in
(19).
Finally, the ordinary differential equation representing the
time evolution for m¯t is simply obtained from (1) by
averaging over the state space and this concludes the proof.
